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Depolarization, Repolarization and Redistributive
Ideological Change in Britain, 1983-2016
Abstract
In this article we examine party sorting, elite cue and ideological polarization ac-
counts of polarization dynamics. We test their diﬀering expectations about trends in
redistributive ideological polarization and partisan polarization in the British case using
repeated cross-section and panel data. We reject party sorting accounts, which require
ideology to be stable and changes in party support to drive partisan polarization, be-
cause we ﬁnd that ideology trends with elite polarization and that ideological change
causes partisan polarization. We reject elite cue accounts, which argue that it is mainly
the ideology of partisans that follows elite polarization, because we ﬁnd virtually identi-
cal trends for initially ideological similar non-partisans too. We thus ﬁnd support for an
ideological polarization account where changes in elite polarization are associated with
general changes in citizen redistributive ideology.
1 Introduction
After decades of convergence on redistributive issues, British political parties are now clearly
polarizing again. Existing research on the relationship between these elite polarization dy-
namics and citizen ideology in Britain is dominated by party sorting mechanisms (Evans
and Neundorf 2018; Milazzo, Adams, and Green 2012; Adams, Green, and Milazzo 2012b;
Adams, Green, and Milazzo 2012a). In these accounts, citizen redistributive ideology is
stable whilst partisanship changes. This means that partisan polarization (the ideological
1
diﬀerence between partisans of diﬀerent parties) increases when elites polarize because ideo-
logical motivations become greater. This leads voters to change their partisanship, not their
ideology, and sort on ideological lines. When elites converge the opposite happens, partisan
depolarization occurs because ideological motivation declines.
Establishing whether party sorting does provide an account of British polarization is
an important question. Finding ideological stability in Britain, probably the most extreme
case of elite depolarization in recent decades, in conjunction with similar ﬁndings in the
other extreme of polarization in the USA, would mean that party sorting mechanism are
general, and ideological change is unlikely ever to be systematically associated with elite
polarization (Adams, Green, and Milazzo 2012a). Stability implies that ideology can act
as a fundamental constraint on the lattitude which parties have for movement because it
operates as an `unmoved mover' in the political system (Evans and Neundorf 2018). Party
sorting ﬁndings also imply that top-down elite changes cause polarization dynamics, because
there are no changes in citizen ideology to be a bottom-up cause (Evans and de Graaf
2013; Evans and Tilley 2012; Evans and Tilley 2011; Evans and Tilley 2017). This gives
polarization dynamics considerable normative importance; the values which parties activate
(or deactivate) by polarizing are associated with social groups and so cause the inclusion
or exclusion of these groups from the political system. Speciﬁcally in the British case it is
argued from party sorting assumptions that elite depolarization caused the decline of class
voting, and the political exclusion of the working class.
In the broader polarization literature there are two main alternatives to party sorting,
both of which stress the importance of ideological change: elite cue accounts, where parti-
sans follow the ideological movement of parties, and ideological polarization accounts where
general changes in citizen ideology are associated with elite polarization. Despite the con-
clusions which are reached, previous research on Britain does not establish the party sorting
case against both elite cue and ideological polarization alternatives. Time-series cross sec-
tional evidence for party sorting rests on the analysis of a small number of observations
over short-time periods, drawn entirely from the period of elite depolarization, where trends
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are not precisely estimated enough to rule out substantial ideological change. Apparently
corroborating evidence, using panel data to study individual level mechanisms, gives results
that are equally consistent with ideological polarization and party sorting mechanisms, only
directly testing elite cue expectations.
In this article we examine party sorting, elite cue and ideological polarization accounts
of redistributive polarization dynamics in Britain. We obtain many more observations over
a longer time period, covering both depolarization and repolarization periods, by using data
from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS), the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
and the British Election Study (BES). We use this data to answer three questions to enable
proper diﬀerentiation between the three accounts of polarization. First, we ask whether
ideology is stable or trends with elite and partisan polarization. Second, we ask whether
partisan polarization dynamics are primarily caused by partisanship or ideological change.
Finally, we ask whether any ideological polarization trends diﬀer between partisans and
initally ideologically similar non-partisans. We reject party sorting accounts, which require
ideology to be stable and changes in party support to drive partisan polarization, because we
ﬁnd that ideology trends with elite polarization and that ideological change causes partisan
polarization. We reject elite cue accounts, which argue that it is primarily the ideology of
partisans that follows elite polarization, because we ﬁnd virtually identical trends for initially
ideological similar non-partisans too. We thus ﬁnd support for an ideological polarization
account where changes in elite polarization are associated with general changes in citizen
redistributive ideology.
These results have importance for the understanding of polarization dynamics generally,
and for the understanding of British politics speciﬁcally, not least because rejecting the party
sorting case reverses many of the implications we described above. We conclude by discussing
the implications which come with an ideological polarization account.
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Figure 1: Elite Polarization in Britain, 1984-2017: Diﬀerence Between Labour and Conserva-
tive General Left Right Positions in Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Polk et al. 2017; Ray 1999;
Bakker et al. 2015; Steenbergen and Marks 2007).
2 Polarization, Partisanship and Ideology
Across Europe, elite depolarization took place over an extended period of time, there was a
reduction in the ideological diﬀerences between parties particularly on the traditional left-
right dimension of redistributive politics (Fiorina 2017; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Kitschelt
1994). The ideological convergence of Labour and Conservative parties in Britain is perhaps
the most extreme example of this, as particularly the Labour Party, but also the Conser-
vatives, shifted to the centre after the highly polarized general election of 1983 in eﬀorts
to become `electable' (Hindmoor 2004; Bale 2017). However, it is now clear that British
political parties are polarizing again, and have been doing so since the time of the ﬁnancial
crisis. This basic pattern of declining and then increasing elite polarization in Britain can be
clearly be seen in expert survey measures of the diﬀerence between Labour and Conservative
left-right positions as shown in Figure 1.
There is now considerable evidence that changes in elite polarization are generally asso-
ciated with changes in partisan polarization, the ideological gap between partisans (Lachat
2008; Adams, de Vries, and Leitner 2012). The clear pattern of partisan depolarization in
Britain, with a substantial decline in ideological diﬀerence between Labour and Conservative
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partisans, has been presented as the `mirror image' of the very well documented partisan
polarization trend which has accompanied elite polarization in the USA since the 1970s
(Adams, Green, and Milazzo 2012b; Green 2007; Green 2015). Unpicking the mechanisms
which drive these trends in partisan polarization and depolarization has become one of the
most important ways of understanding the relationship between elite polarization dynamics
and public opinion (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Hetherington 2009). In the large literature on
these topics, much of which focuses on the US case, three mechanisms have been identiﬁed
as causing changes in levels of partisan polarization: party sorting, ideological polarization
and elite cues.
Party sorting mechanisms are widely found in accounts of partisan polarization and depo-
larization in both the US and other contexts (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2008; Levendusky
2009; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Fiorina 2017; Lachat 2008; Green 2007). In short, the
party sorting mechanism is that partisan polarization is caused by partisan identity changing
whilst ideology remains constant (both for partisans and for all other citizens). With party
sorting mechanisms, partisan polarization and depolarization arise because elites, not vot-
ers, change their ideological positions. When party elites are polarized, even though citizen
ideology remains constant, party ideological signals become clearer and more consequential.
Thus ideology becomes a more important factor in party evaluation causing partisanship to
change and so become sorted along ideological lines.
The second account of partisan polarization dynamics, most clearly developed in the US
literature, invokes general ideological polarization mechanisms (Abramowitz and Saunders
1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz 2013; Campbell 2016).
In short, the ideological polarization mechanism is that partisan polarization is caused by
changes in the ideology of all citizens (partisans and non-partisans alike), whilst partisan
identity remains constant. This generalized ideological polarization involves an increase in
the dispersion of attitudes with positions moving away from the centre and towards extreme
values. Because changes are occurring in relatively abstract general principles or values, dy-
namics will aﬀect the relationship between attitudes, that is ideological constraint (Converse
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1964) and because they are general they will be found across all sub-groups in society, and
will not be restricted to partisans. Ideological polarization accounts most frequently argue
that elite and partisan polarization are linked because parties respond to changing voter po-
larization. In this bottom-up version, mass ideological change is usually thought to be driven
by long-term social and economic trends, like changing class or racial population structures
and extended periods of material security, and by responses to critical events like economic
crises (Kitschelt 1994; Inglehart 2018; Abramowitz 2010).
The third account of partisan polarization in the US literature stresses elite cue mecha-
nisms, which also expect ideological change but give partisanship a much more fundamental
role in causing this. In short, the elite cue mechanism is that partisan polarization is caused
by the ideology of partisans changing, whilst partisan identity and the ideology of non-
partisans remains more stable. These mechanisms build on the theory that partisanship is a
very stable identity with dynamics governed by psychological and social identity processes,
so as parties shift their policy oﬀerings, voters are very likely to update their ideology to
match the positions taken up by the politicians they trust (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler
2004; Goren 2005; Zaller 1992). Partisan polarization dynamics are thus driven by processes
of `conﬂict extension' as polarization moves from elites to partisans who take cues from them
(Layman and Carsey 2002; Layman, Carsey, et al. 2010). When polarization and depolariza-
tion are driven by elite cue mechanisms we do expect there to be evidence of patterns of real
ideological change, but we expect to ﬁnd these ideological changes mainly in the layer of the
population who are receptive to the cue; that is we expect partisans to change ideologially
much more than initially ideologically similar non-partisans.
Whilst it is possible that all three mechanisms could be contributing to the observed
patterns of partisan polarization, in the USA the debate has revolved around the question of
whether polarization is driven purely by party sorting. The central evidence supporting this
position is that despite very clear patterns of partisan polarization taking place over decades,
there is no evidence of ideological change in long-term cross-sectional data (DiMaggio, Evans,
and Bryson 1996; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). In the US case considerable eﬀort has gone
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into looking at a large number of observations relating to many issues over long-term periods
because establishing the absence of systematic trends requires precise estimates and because
detecting ideological trends in cross-sectional data is anyway diﬃcult. Opponents of the
party sorting account have contributed to these debates by providing evidence that they
argue shows that partisan polarization arises in part through ideological change mechanisms,
but have not claimed that party sorting dynamics are absent.
Scholars examining British politics in these terms have provided unanimous support for
the `pure' party sorting account, that is the view that partisan depolarization is driven
entirely by partisanship change, in conditions of ideological stability. The party sorting
account ﬁts with the established view of the way in which ideology operates in British politics
where, particularly on the redistributive dimension it has long been argued that ideology is
`stable and enduring over time at the individual as well as the aggregate level' (Evans,
Heath, and Lalljee 1996; Heath, Evans, and Martin 1994; Bartle 2000, p.120). More recent
research on the post-Thatcher period of elite convergence in British politics, using both
cross-sectional and panel data, has been more directly inspired by, and explicitly supportive
of US party sorting models. Cross-sectional research has concluded that elite depolarization
causes important shifts in partisanship but not in ideology, because data from four waves
of the British Election Study shows clear partisan depolarization trends, but much more
mixed and modest patterns of ideological change (Adams, Green, and Milazzo 2012b; Adams,
Green, and Milazzo 2012a). Closely related research using panel data from the depolarization
period to model individual level dynamics from cross-lagged regressions also supports party
sorting mechanisms (Milazzo, Adams, and Green 2012; Evans and Neundorf 2018). Elite cue
ideological change mechanisms are rejected because partisanship has no eﬀect on ideology,
but ideology has an eﬀect on partisanship. Ideology also has a stronger eﬀect on partisanship
when parties are more polarized (i.e. earlier in the periods under study) which is taken
as further evidence that partisan change rather than ideological change is responsible for
partisan depolarization. Ideological depolarization mechanisms are also rejected by Evans
and Neundorf (2018), who argue that redistributive values should be seen as `stable aspects
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of voters political belief systems' and endorse the conclusion ﬁrst reached by Adams, Green,
and Milazzo that there has been a `non-convergence of the British public's policy beliefs'
because they ﬁnd very high levels of ideological stability.
3 Issues with the existing literature
Although there is currently a party sorting consensus that partisanship change accounts for
partisan depolarization in post-Thatcher Britain, there are reasons to be concerned about
both the time-series cross-sectional and the panel evidence supporting this view.
The existing time-series cross-sectional argument for party sorting in Britain comes from
ﬁnding clear and consistent partisan depolarization trends whilst ideology is stable or at most
modestly depolarizing. The fact that two conclusions about ideological trends are left open is
concerning because there is an important diﬀerence between the ideological stability case and
the case where ideology trends with partisan polarization (even if modestly). Party sorting
conclusions only follow if ideology is stable. As we will see, apparently modest patterns
of ideological change can cause dramatic partisan depolarization even when partisanship is
stable.1 These two possibilities are left open in the British case because trends are much
less precisely measured than in the US case, primarily because British conclusions have been
based on a data set with at most 24 data points, whilst in the American case analysis involves
hundreds or even thousands of data points (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Baldassarri
and Gelman 2008).2 In addition, existing cross-sectional research on Britain has looked only
at the period of depolarization and not at the recent period of polarization. This is despite the
fact that the shift in the direction of elite polarization in Britain at the time of the ﬁnancial
crisis, should help identify genuinely associated patterns because trends will all reverse at
this point in time, whilst in the American case, where polarization has been increasing for
1Aggregate level ideological stability is evidence for partisanship switching mechanisms because then only
very unlikely pattens of ideological change produce partisan depolarization (non-partisans have to become
more extreme as partisans moderate). If ideology trends with partisan polarization, then many forms of
ideological change produce modest ideological polarization and more striking partisan polarization.
2Adams, Green, and Milazzo (2012a) compare the ﬁrst and last of sixteen (for standard deviation and
attitude extremism) or twenty-four (for constraint) data points.
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over forty years, patterns cannot be distinguished from other linear time trends.
Apparently corroborating arguments using panel data to model individual level dynamics
are based on the parameters of cross-lagged panel models alone, even though these parameters
are not suitable for adjudicating between ideological depolarization and party sorting mech-
anisms. Whilst cross-lagged panel models do provide evidence about whether the ideological
dynamics of partisans diﬀer from those of initially ideologically similar non-partisans (as ex-
pected by elite cue mechanism), as we show in Appendix A, the issue is that they provide
ambiguous answers to other questions needed to rule out ideological depolarization; par-
ticularly on questions of ideological stability and whether partisanship change or ideological
change is primarily responsible for causing partisan depolarization trends. This is because the
model parameters describe transition matrices, and the eﬀect of a transition matrix depends
on the initial population it operates on. Thus, precisely the same multi-nominal cross-lagged
panel model parameters can describe radically diﬀerent patterns of ideological change, from
sharp ideological depolarization (in initially polarized conditions), through ideological sta-
bility (in initially equilibrium condition) to ideological polarization (in initially depolarized
conditions). For the same reason, the model parameters are ambiguous on the question of
whether ideological or partisanship change is responsible for partisan polarization. The same
patterns of cross-lag and stability coeﬃcients could describe a situation where changes in
partisan polarization are caused primarily by partisanship changes or caused primarily by
ideological changes (depending on initial conditions). As we will show, it is possible to pro-
duce answers to the questions of whether ideology is stable, depolarizing or polarizing and
whether ideological change or partisanship change is responsible for partisan depolarization
by supplementing the model parameters with other information (particularly about initial
population compositions). However, the existing panel analysis does not do this but rather
attempts to make inferences from model parameters alone.
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4 Approach and Data
The ﬁrst concern which we raise about the existing conclusions is that they are based on a
narrow evidence base, which generates a small number of observations on a small number of
redistributive issues over a short period of time only from the period of depolarizaiton. To
address this we use a broader evidence base, giving more observations on more redistributive
issues over a longer period of time relating to periods of both polarization and depolarization.
The second concern we raised was that cross-lagged panel models provide ambigious answers
which are consistent with not just party sorting but also ideological polarization accounts.
In order to address this concern we answer a series of three questions, which when combined
decide between party sorting, elite cue and ideological polarization accounts, using methods
which provide determinate answers to these question. Below we describe the data which we
use to obtain the greater number of observations and then the questions and the expectations
relating to them which are necessary to decide between the three accounts of depolarization.
We describe the methods used to provide unambiguous answers in the subsequent sections
dedicated to each question. At the end of each section we also directly compare our ﬁndings
with results of previous analysis.
Our approach to measuring ideological trends follows that of Baldassarri and Gelman
(2008), who study polarization in general using as wide a range of political attitudes as
possible. Hence we study redistributive polarization and depolarization using as wide a
range of redistributive attitudes as possible. We use data from the three long-running surveys
which provide longitudinal evidence about the relationship between redistributive ideology
and partisanship in Britain since the 1980s. Our primary evidence for establishing long-
term trends comes from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS), because this provides
nationally representative information about party identiﬁcation and redistributive attitudes
for almost every year since 1983. The BSAS includes 17 questions about redistributive
attitudes have been asked three times or more in both the period of elite depolarization
from 1983-2007 and the period of repolarization from 2007 onward, and where ﬁve of these
attitudes constitute a widely used and validated redistributive attitude scale (Evans, Heath,
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and Lalljee 1996). This data set contains 102,858 observations in 32 survey waves.
The theories we are investigating link aggregate trends over long periods of time to indi-
vidual level mechanisms, which we will investigate using panel data in the ﬁnal parts of our
analysis. To link to this and to address the potential concern that aggregate level ideological
trends are driven by changes in population composition (generational replacement) not indi-
vidual level ideological dynamics (Inglehart 1997) we use the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) which asked a six-item redistributive scale in seven waves between 1991 and 2007
(Heath, Evans, and Martin 1994). We analyse the 4636 respondents from the BHPS who
answered all seven of these waves, so the composition of the sample in all waves is identical.
By looking at long-term trends where population composition is held constant we eliminate
the possibility that those trends are driven by changes in population composition this will
show that trends are linked to individual level mechanisms.
In order to compare our ﬁndings with previous research, our analysis also includes the
four redistributive questions from the four waves of the British Election Study data 1987-
2001 used by Adams, Green, and Milazzo (2012a) to argue for party sorting conclusions.
This data is a composite of nationally representative and ﬁxed composition data because it
takes three waves of cross-sectional data and puts this together with the ﬁnal wave of a three
wave panel. This data set contains 11,260 observations in four survey waves.
Further details including the wording of the 27 redistributive questions asked in these
three surveys can be found in Appendix B. To facilitate interpretation we recode all of these
so that the scale runs from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 1 and make the most
pro-redistributive position 1 on the scale. Whilst all these questions concern redistributive
values, there are potentially important diﬀerences between them.3 The multi-level modelling
approach we use addresses this potential heterogeneity by not only estimating average trends,
but also the variability in trends. This varibility in trends indicates whether average trends
result from all issues trending together, or whether there is a large variation in trends across
issues.
3For example, the BES asks self-placement questions (eleven response points), whilst the BSAS and the
BHPS mainly ask agree-disagree questions (ﬁve response points).
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All three surveys also include a very similar measure of partisan identiﬁcation which asks
respondents if they identify with a political party, and if not if they are closer to one of the
parties. Following standard practice we treat those who identify with or feel closer to a party
as party identiﬁers. We code Labour partisanship as 1, and Conservative partisanship as 0
treating all other values as missing.
The series of three questions which we use to decide between the theories is as follows:
First, we ask whether ideological trends are associated with partisan and elite polarization
trends. Second, we ask whether partisan polarization is primarily caused by ideological or
partisanship change. Finally, we ask whether any ideological convergence patterns diﬀer
between partisans and initially ideologically similar non-partisans. The party sorting expec-
tations is that ideology is stable, so we will not ﬁnd ideological changes associated with elite
and partisan polarization, and that partisanship change rather than ideological change is
the primary cause of partisan depolarization. The ideological depolarization and elite cue
mechanisms share the expectation of ideological change, so we will observe that ideology
does move with elite and partisan polarization. Elite cue mechanisms expect depolarization
to be much greater amongst partisans, so we will ﬁnd that ideological convergence is much
more pronounced amongst partisans than initially ideologically similar non-partisans. How-
ever, ideological polarization accounts expect ideological convergence amongst partisans and
non-partisans alike.
5 Was ideological polarization associated with elite and
partisan polarization?
The question of whether ideological trends match partisan (and elite) polarization trends
is a well established one, and we make use of well established methods to study it, our
contribution comes from analysing the data described above with many more observations
over a longer time period, where this data encompasses that used in previous analysis.
We follow Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) by measuring partisan polarization with the
12
(Pearson) correlation coeﬃcient between ideological attitudes and partisanship. With a bi-
nary measure of partisanship this provides a scaled measure of the ideological gap between the
partisans. We follow Adams, Green, and Milazzo (2012a) in the three measures of ideological
polarization we use. The ﬁrst two of these are measures of dispersal, attitude standard devi-
ations and attitude extremism (the proportion of responses falling into either of the extreme
categories on the scale). The ﬁnal measure examines attitude constraint with the (Pearson)
correlation coeﬃcient between two attitudes making up an attitude pair. All attitudes are
included in the partisan polarizatoin and constraint analysis but as in Munzert and Bauer
(2013) we exclude short scales (three categories or less) from the analysis of dispersal.
5.1 Was partisan polarization associated with elite polarization?
All three mechanisms expect that the ideological gap between partisans will be greater when
parties are polarized, so if partisan polarization is not associated with elite polarization then
none of the mechanisms can be functioning as expected. We begin our analysis by checking
this common expectation that partisan polarization in Britain did decline during the period
of elite depolarization and then increase during the period of elite polarization.
To test for trends in these coeﬃcients, Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) introduced the
use of varying intercept, varying slope multi-level models, using time in decades as a proxy
for increasing polarization. The dependent variable is the survey wave correlation between
attitude i and partisanship in year t, yit. Fomally:
yit = αi + βit+ it
The second-level unit is the attitude. Our primary interest is in the overall trend β, that
is the model estimated mean of βi.
4 In the British case there was depolarization to 2007
and repolarization after this date, so we ﬁt separate models to the data for the period up
to 2007 and the period from 2007-16, with the primary expectation of downward trends to
2007, and so a negative β, and upward trends after 2007, and a positive β. This gives our
ﬁrst hypothesis:
4Models are ﬁt using Stan via RStanarm.(Stan Development Team 2016)
13
H1 Partisan polarization is associated with elite polarization.
We move immediately to test this hypothesis. Figure 2, following Baldassarri and Gelman
(2008), plots the data and trend lines which are later summarized in regression form. The
general purpose of these plots is to provide reassurance that results are not artefacts of the
model but are driven by important features of the data. However, in this ﬁrst instance we
also use this ﬁgure to provide a futher explanation of the model parameters. The ﬁgure is
split into 27 facets, one for each of the attitudes we are studying. Within each facet we plot
the data, that is each point in the ﬁgure represents a survey wave correlation between that
attitude and a Labour-Conservative partisanship dummy variable. Some facets have more
points than others because some questions were asked more often, for example the BHPS
redistribution questions were only asked seven times all in the period 1991-2007 and the BES
redistribution questions were only asked four times in the period 1987-2001. Partially pooling
the evidence, which is particularly consequential for attitudes where there is little evidence,
the model ﬁts a regression line to the data for each attitude (separately for the period of
depolarization and the period of repolarization) and the median estimate of each of the 27
regression lines is plotted on the ﬁgure. Fit lines which have a median negative slope are
coloured red, and ﬁt lines which have a median positive slope are coloured blue.
ρ = attitude × partisanship
1983-2007 2007-2016
All Surveys BSA BHPS BES BSA
Intercept 0.41 (0.03) 0.35 (0.03) 0.56 (0.02) 0.46 (0.05) -0.06 (0.03)
Time (decades) -0.09 (0.01) -0.07 (0.01) -0.16 (0.02) -0.10 (0.03) 0.10 (0.02)
Residual SD:
Intercepts 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.10 0.10
Trends 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
Data 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03
N 357 299 42 16 158
Groups 27 17 6 4 17
Table 1: Results of Multi-Level Models With Dependent Variable as Attitude Partisanship
(Correlation of Attitude with Labour (v. Conservative) Partisanship) in Period 1983-2007
and 2007-2016. Models show results across all three surveys and in each survey independently.
This evidence is summarized in the regression table in Table 1 which also breaks the
14
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Figure 2: Trends in Partisan Depolarization and Repolarization in the Redistributive Atti-
tudes in the BSAS, the BHPS and the BES. For the survey questions relating to each facet
see appendix B.
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results down by survey. The key coeﬃcient of interest is the coeﬃcient on time in decades,
measured here in decades after 1983. The ﬁrst model in the table provides a summary across
all twenty-seven attitudes in all three surveys in the period 1983-2007. The intercept .41
(SE: .03) indicates the average correlation between redistributive attitudes and partisanship
in 1983, when time was 0, and the SD on intercepts of .15 indicates that about two-thirds of
the intercepts will fall between .56 (=.41 + .15) and .26 (=.41 - .15). Our central interest is
in the coeﬃcient on time in decades of -.09 (SE: .01) indicates that on average the correlation
between partisanship and redistributive attitudes declined by .09 per decade, or by .23 in
the twenty-four year period between 1983 and 2007. The SD of .06 on trends is informative
about the distribution of trends around this average, with 95% of trends modeled to fall
in the range -.21 and +.03 (i.e. within about two standard deviations of the mean). This
signiﬁcant negative trend is seen in the data overall, and also in the three surveys individually.
In the period after 2007, when we only have BSAS data, there is a clear positive average
trend of +.10 (SE: .02) per decade with a SD of .05, this indicates that not only is there a
clear average trend of partisan polarization but that polarization is expected to occur on the
overwhelming majority of redistributive attitudes.
Overall, we ﬁnd a clear negative coeﬃcient on time in the period of depolarization and a
clear positive coeﬃcient on time in the period of repolarization. This is strong evidence in
support of H1 that partisan polarization is associated with elite polarization.
5.2 Was ideological polarization associated with elite polarization
The central diﬀerence between ideological polarization and elite cue theories on the one side
and party sorting accounts on the other is that the former two mechanisms create expecta-
tions that elite and partisan polarization is accompanied by systematic ideological change,
in the form of ideological polarization. On the other hand, if patterns of ideological stability
are found this is a key piece of evidence for party sorting arguments. To examine whether
party polarization is associated with real ideological change, we examine whether there were
decreases in attitude extremism, attitude standard deviations and attitude constraint during
16
periods of elite and partisan depolarization and increases in these measures during periods
of elite and partisan polarization. To analyse the three diﬀerent aspect of ideological polar-
ization we ﬁt separate models where yit is in turn ﬁrst, the proportion of extreme attitudes
in issue i at time t, second, the standard deviation of issue issue i at time t and then ﬁnally
the correlation between issue pair i at time t. In each case we ﬁt separate models to the
period of elite depolarization, where we have measures from the three diﬀerent surveys, and
repolarization, where we only have data from the BSAS, with the expectation of signiﬁcant
negative coeﬃcients on time for the period 1983-2007 and signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients on
time the period 2007-16. This enables us to test our second hypothesis:
H2 Ideological polarization is associated with elite polarization.
1983-2007 (surveys combined) 2007-2016 (BSAS only)
extreme σ constraint extreme σ constraint
Intercept 0.24 (0.02) 0.21 (0.01) 0.25 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.18 (0.00) 0.07 (0.02)
Time (decades) -0.04 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00) -0.03 (0.00) 0.04 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00)
Residual SD:
Intercepts 0.11 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.19
Trends 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03
Data 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
N 275 275 2124 130 130 1176
Groups 23 23 157 13 13 136
Table 2: Results of Multi-Level Models of Ideological Depolarization with Dependent Variable
as proportion of extreme responses, standard deviation of responses, constraint between
attitude pairs in Period 1983-2007 and 2007-16.
We again move directly to test this hypothesis. The results, summarized in Table 2,
show a consistent pattern across all three measures of ideological change. For the period of
depolarization we ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative trends in extreme values (-.04, SE: .01), standard
deviations (-.01, SE: .00) and constraint (-.03, SE: .00). For the period of repolarization we
ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive trends in extreme values (.04 SE: .01), standard deviations (.01 SE:
.00) and constraint (.05 SE:.00).
For the period of elite depolarization where we have three surveys to compare, trends
are consistent across surveys. As we show in Appendix C, signiﬁcant negative trends are
17
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Figure 3: Trends in Standard Deviation of Redistributive Attitudes, 1983-2007 and 2007-2016
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found on all three measures of ideological change in the BSAS alone and the BHPS alone.
The trends in the BES data alone are negative for all three measures, but only statistically
signiﬁcant for standard deviations.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between regression trends and the underlying data for
case of standard deviations. We plot only this case for reasons of space, displaying standard
deviations not just because they are perhaps the most natural of the three measures of
polarization, but also because the trends (and the directional shifts in 2007) are of the
smallest magnitude, and so are the least likely to be graphically observable. We provide
similar plots for extreme values and attitude constraint trends in Appendix C.
Overall, ﬁnding declining ideological polarization during the period of elite and partisan
depolarization, and increasing ideological polarization during the period of elite and partisan
polarization is clear evidence that ideological polarization is associated with elite and partisan
polarization. We note additionally that this pattern cannot be explained solely by changing
population composition; for the period when both sets of data are available, we ﬁnd the
same pattern in both the nationally representative BSAS and the BHPS looking at the same
sample of individuals in each wave. We conclude therefore that there is substantial evidence
of ideological change at the aggregate and individual levels and that this real ideological
change is associated with elite and partisan polarization.
5.3 Relationship to previous ﬁndings
How does this conclusion, that ideological polarization is associated with elite and partisan
polarization, relate to existing conclusions based on panel data and time-series cross-sectional
patterns?
Our ﬁndings of ideological depolarization in the BHPS directly contradicts the conclusion
of aggregate level ideological stability drawn in Evans and Neundorf (2018) from panel data
despite analysing the same data set. Table 3 reproduces the cross-lagged model parameters
in their transition matrix form. Evans and Neundorf make the inference that there was no
ideological convergence and that ideology was `very stable' simply from the large transition
19
Ideology [t-1]
[t] Centrist Leftist Rightist
Centrist .97 .13 .07
Leftist .02 .87 .00
Rightist .01 .00 .93
Table 3: Estimated Transition Matrix of Latent Class Model (Source: Calculated from Evans
and Neundorf (2018) Table 1)
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Figure 4: Projected growth in centrist ideological group and declines in size of left and right
ideological groupings from model in Evans and Neundorf (2018).
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probabilities on the matrix diagonal. In the introduction we pointed out that the parameters
of multi-nominal cross-lagged panel models alone do not generally determine whether ideology
is stable or depolarizing, this is because they generally determine an equilibrium condition and
move the population composition towards this. The transition matrix in Table 3 has a very
depolarized equilibrium (77% centrist, 12% leftist and 11% rightist) and will cause ideological
depolarization in any initial population more polarized than the equilibrium. Figure 4 shows
the ideological trends caused by this matrix from the initial conditions that result in the
seven wave aggregate population composition reported in Evans and Neundorf (58% centrist,
20% leftist, 22% rightist). There is a clear pattern of ideological depolarization from 1991
to 2007 with centrism increasing (from 49% to 65%), leftism declining (from 25% to 16%)
and rightism declining (from 25% to 19%). This shows, contrary to the explicit conclusion
in Evans and Neundorf (2018), that multi-nominal cross-lagged panel analysis also implies a
substantial trend of ideological depolarization between 1991 and 2007.
Previous time-series cross-section research using BES data only from the period of elite
depolarization argued for party sorting mechanisms because ideology was stable or at most
modestly depolarizing whilst there was a clear pattern of partisan depolarization (Adams,
Green, and Milazzo 2012a). Our results reﬁne this picture by showing that during the period
of elite depolarization ideology was not stable but rather depolarized signiﬁcantly and extend
this picture by examining a longer time-period which includes the period of elite repolariza-
tion, where we ﬁnd clear and consistent pattterns of partisan and ideological repolarization.
The extension has signiﬁcance, because the common reversal of direction in trends in the
mid-2000s helps establish that the patterns we describe are connected rather than just being
unconnected uni-directional trends and it reinforces the case ﬁrst made by (Adams, Green,
and Milazzo 2012a) that polarization and depolarization can be thought of as mirror im-
ages. The reﬁnement has signiﬁcance because showing that there are patterns of systematic
ideological change means that party sorting conclusions are not implied. In the presence of
ideological change partisan depolarization patterns could come either from partisanship or
ideological change. Thus, further evidence is needed to decide whether partisanship changes
21
or ideological changes cause partisan polarization.
6 Was partisan depolarization caused by ideological or
partisanship change?
Given that we have found a pattern of ideological change we now ask whether this ideological
change or partisanship change was responsible for partisan depolarization. To do this we use
the panel data which is of exceptionally long duration with seven waves over sixteen-years
of partisan depolarization, from 1991 to 2007. To examine whether partisanship change or
ideological change caused partisan depolarization we exploit this unusual data to compare two
`counterfactual' partisan polarization trends, to the observed pattern of partisan polarization.
The ﬁrst counterfactual trend describes what would have happened to partisan polariza-
tion if people had changed only their partisanship, keeping their ideology stable. We label this
`ﬁxed ideology depolarization'. Fixed ideology depolarization describes the partisan depolar-
ization trend which arises from partisanship change alone. If the party sorting mechanism of
partisanship change is the main cause of partisan depolarization then we would expect very
little diﬀerence between the observed pattern of partisan depolarization and ﬁxed ideology
depolarization, whilst if ideological change is necessary to explain partisan depolarization
then we would expect these diﬀerences to be large.
The second counterfactual trend describes what would have happened to partisan po-
larization if people had changed only their ideology keeping their partisanship stable. We
label this `ﬁxed partisan depolarization'. Fixed partisan depolarization describes the parti-
san depolarization which arises from ideological change alone. If ideological change (through
either elite cue or ideological depolarization mechanisms) is primarily responsible for parti-
san depolarization then we would expect very little diﬀerence between the observed pattern
of partisan depolarization and ﬁxed partisan depolarization, whilst if partisanship change is
necessary to explain partisan depolarization we would expect these diﬀerences to be large.
We construct the ﬁxed ideology trend by measuring the ideological gap at a ﬁxed point in
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time (the initial wave) between partisans in each wave (that is we take the correlation between
partisanship in each wave and ideology in the 1991 survey wave). Measuring ideology at a
ﬁxed point in time means there is no change in ideological positions, only in the composition
of the partisan groups.
We construct the the ﬁxed partisanship trend by measuring the ideological gap in each
wave between the group of partisans in the initial wave (that is we take the correlation
between partisanship in the 1991 wave and ideology in each wave). This ﬁxes the composition
of the group of individuals we examine, leaving only ideological change to cause trends.
We test these expectations using an extension of the multi-level model used in H1, where
the coeﬃcient on time measures the observed partisan depolarization trend, which becomes
the baseline coeﬃcient on time in this model. We use a data set containing the observed, the
ﬁxed partisan and ﬁxed ideology survey wave correlation coeﬃcients where dummy variables
indicates whether the partisanship or the ideological measure is ﬁxed in its 1991 state. Our
primary interest is in the interaction between these dummy variables and time, which gives
the diﬀerence between the observed depolarization trend and ﬁxed ideology depolarization
and ﬁxed partisan depolarization respectively. This gives two hypotheses:
H3a Ideological change is required to explain partisan depolarization: the observed trend
of partisan depolarization is negative and substantially larger in magnitude than ﬁxed
ideology depolarization.
H3b Partisan change is required to explain partisan depolarization: the observed trend of
partisan depolarization is negative and substantially larger in magnitude than ﬁxed
partisan depolarization.
The evidence on this is found in Figure 5 and is summarized in regression Table 4.
The ﬁgure plots observed partisan depolarization (grey) together with the ﬁxed ideology
(top panels in black) and the ﬁxed partisanship (bottom panels in black) depolarization
trends. The basic pattern evident in this plot shows that ideological change is more important
that partisanship change because the observed pattern more closely resembles ﬁxed partisan
23
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Figure 5: Partisan depolarization mechanisms in the BHPS 1991-2007 data. Observed pat-
terns of partisan depolarization together with ﬁxed ideology depolarization and ﬁxed partisan
depolarization. The grey data shows the observed patterns in each survey wave. The black
data show the position if either ideology (in the top row) or partisanship (in the bottom row)
is held at its 1991 value.
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ρ = attitude × partisanship
Intercept 0.44 (0.02)
Time (decades) -0.14 (0.01)
ﬁxed ideology -0.02 (0.03)
ﬁxed partisanship -0.02 (0.03)
Time × ﬁxed ideology 0.12 (0.02)
Time × ﬁxed partisanship 0.03 (0.02)
Residual SD:
Intercepts 0.06
Trends 0.03
Data 0.03
N 126
Groups 18
Table 4: Results of Multi-Level Models With Dependent Variable as Correlation between
Redistributive Attitude and Partisanship in the BHPS 1991-2007. The models show trends
in the observed data, stable (1991) ideology, stable (1991) partisanship and with dummy
variable indicating the condition.
depolarization (where only ideology change) than ﬁxed ideology depolarization (where only
partisanship changes). This is formally tested with H3a and H3b using Table 4.
Hypothesis 3a, that ideological change is required to explain partisan depolarization,
is tested with the expectation of a large positive interaction between the ﬁxed ideology
dummy variable and time. The diﬀerence between the ﬁxed ideology trend and the observed
depolarization trend, expressed by this coeﬃcient (.12; SE .02), is positive, substantively large
relative to the observed depolarization trend (-.14; SE .01) and is statistically signiﬁcant.
Indeed it indicates that without ideological change partisan depolarization would have been
about -.02 per decade rather than -.14, so about 85 per cent of the observed depolarization
would not have occurred. The evidence leads us to accept H3a, the observed trend of partisan
depolarization is much greater in magnitude than the ﬁxed ideology depolarization trend,
holding ideology constant makes a very large diﬀerence to the observed pattern of ideological
convergence. Contrary to party sorting expectations, ideological change is required to explain
the observed pattern of partisan depolarization.
Hypothesis 3b, that partisanship change is required to explain partisan depolarization,
is tested with the expectation of a large positive interaction between the ﬁxed partisanship
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dummy variable and time. In Table 4, the diﬀerence between the large observed depolariza-
tion trend and the ﬁxed partisanship trend, expressed by the ﬁxed partisanship interaction
with time, is small and statistically not signiﬁcant (.03; SE .02). This indicates that without
partisanship change the estimated depolarization trend would have been -.11 which is close
to (indeed not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from) the observed depolarization trend of -.14. This
evidence leads us to reject H3b, the observed trend of partisan depolarization is not much
greater in magnitude than ﬁxed partisanship depolarization, holding partisanship constant
makes only a very small diﬀerence to the observed pattern of ideological convergence. Con-
trary to party sorting expectations, partisanship change is not required to explain partisan
depolarization.
This ﬁnding, that ideological change not partisanship change was the primary cause of
partisan depolarization directly contradicts the claim in Evans and Neundorf (2018) that par-
tisanship change was the main cause of partisan depolarization. As in the case of ideological
depolarization, the issue is that no inferences about this matter can safely be made using the
method in Evans and Neundorf (2018) of looking at model parameters alone, information
about initial sample compositions is also required. In appendix A.2 we show that once this
additional information is used cross-lagged panel analysis also implies that ideological change
and not partisanship change was primarily responsible for partisan depolarization.
7 Did partisanship cause depolarization?
Finally, we examine the elite cue claim that partisanship causes ideological depolarization
so that partisans change their ideology much more dramatically than initially ideologically
similar non-partisans. We do this by comparing the ideological convergence of partisans
to the ideological convergence of an initially ideologically similar group of non-partisans.
In the initial wave of the survey we match non-partisans and partisans ideologically. We
use matching methods to ﬁnd a group of initially leftist non-partisans whose ideological
distribution matches that of the Labour partisans in 1991, and a group of initially rightist
non-partisans whose ideological distribution matches that of the Conservative partisans in
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1991.5 We have already seen in H3b above that there is substantial convergence between
partisans.6 The elite cue expectation is that the magnitude of the ideological convergence
amongst the partisans will be much greater than the magnitude of convergence amongst the
matched non-partisans.
We measure the ideological gap between the non-partisan groups, which we call matched
non-partisan depolarization, with the correlation between a leftist dummy variable (with
initially-leftist non-partisans coded 1 and initially rightist non-partisans as 0) and each re-
distributive attitude in each survey wave. We compare ﬁxed partisan depolarization to the
matched non-partisan depolarization, using a data set which combines the survey wave cor-
relation coeﬃcient measuring ﬁxed partisan depolarization with the survey wave correlation
coeﬃcients matched non-partisan depolarization. A dummy variable indicates whether the
coeﬃcient relates to the partisans. Our primary interest is the interaction between the parti-
san dummy variable and time which gives the diﬀerence between ﬁxed partisan depolarization
and matched non-partisan depolarization.
H4 Ideological depolarization is more pronounced amongst partisans than initially ideolog-
ical similar non-partisans.
The evidence on this question is shown in Figure 6 and summarized in Table 5. Figure
6a shows the mean position of the initially left- and right-wing non-partisans in each of the
survey waves, it also shows the trajectory of the group of initially Labour and Conservative
partisans. We include these mean plots to increase conﬁdence that the matching is working as
expected. In particular, the small diﬀerences between the partisan and matched group means
in 1991 provides visual conﬁrmation of matching success.7 Figure 6b plots the key evidence
5We use the matching methods described in (Ho et al. 2007) and the associated MatchIt package in R
to predict initial partisanship from initial ideology using logistic regression and then select non-partisans
from the initial wave of the BHPS who have the same distribution of expected Labour partisanship and
Conservative partisanship as the actual partisans. Matching balances treatment and control groups, any
method not involving post-treatment variables, which achieved this balance would be appropriate and the
matching method plays no further role in the analysis. The diagnostic of matching success is balance between
groups.
6In appendix D.1 we also show that there is evidence of ideological depolarization in the ﬁxed group of
partisans and the ﬁxed group of non-partisans.
7A more formal assessment of the balance is provided in appendix D.2.
27
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
fairshare gvtprovjob onelaw privateent stateown strngtu
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
decades after 1991
po
sit
io
n
l con
con match
lab
lab match
(a) Initial wave Labour and non-partisan leftist and
Conservative and non-partisan rightist mean ideolog-
ical positions in each survey wave.
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
fairshare gvtprovjob onelaw privateent stateown strngtu
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0.0
0.2
0.4
decades after 1991
co
rr
e
la
tio
n
l matches
partisans
(b) Partisan depolarization (measured by partisan-
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Figure 6: Ideological depolarization in the BHPS 1991-2007. Ideological trajectories of par-
tisans and non-partisans matched on initial ideological position. Showing ideological trajec-
tories of ﬁxed groups of initial Labour and initial Conservative partisan and of ﬁxed groups
of non-partisans with initial ideology matching the ideology of the initial Labour and Con-
servative partisans.
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ρ = attitude × Labour or left non-partisan
partisans and ideologists
Intercept 0.36 (0.02)
Time (decades) -0.10 (0.02)
partisans 0.06 (0.04)
Time × ﬁxed partisanship -0.01 (0.02)
Residual SD:
Intercepts 0.06
Trends 0.03
Data 0.04
N 84
Groups 12
Table 5: Results of Multi-Level Models With Dependent Variable as Correlation between
Redistributive Attitude and Fixed Group Partisanship and Ideologist Dummy Variables in
BHPS 1991-2007.
of interest, the convergence between both the partisans (dashed line) and the matched non-
partisan (solid line). The elite cue expectation is that the negative trend indicating partisan
ideological convergence will not be shared by the matched non-partisans. In the regression
table describing this data in Table 5 the central elite cue expectation is of a large negative
interaction between the matched non-partisan dummy variable and time. Visually the plots
suggest that the systematic pattern of convergence for both groups is about the same, and
this is summarized statistically in the model, where the -.01 (SE: .02) coeﬃcient on the
relevant interaction is small and statistically insigniﬁcant. We therefore reject H4, with the
ﬁnding that ideological convergence took place amongst partisans and non-partisans alike.
This ﬁnding, that the ideological trajectories of partisans and non-partisans are similar,
is in agreement with the claim in Evans and Neundorf (2018) that partisanship has little
impact on ideology. However, they describe this pattern as similar ideological stability.
In Appendix A.3 we show that their cross-lagged panel parameters when combined with
information about initial conditions agrees with our description that the ideology of partisans
and initially ideologically similar non-partisans converged substantially, with convergence at
an approximately equal rate.
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8 Discussion and Conclusion
Since the ﬁnancial crisis, British political parties have been polarizing again after decades
of convergence on redistributive ideology. Party sorting accounts, which stress ideological
stability and argue that partisan polarization results from partisanship change, provide the
existing basis for understanding how these elite polarization dynamics connect to public opin-
ion. However, elite cue and ideological depolarization accounts, which are prominent in the
broader polarization literature, have not been suﬃciently examined in the British context.
In this article we answered three questions which enabled us to choose between party sort-
ing, elite cue and ideological polarization accounts of polarization dynamics. We examined
ﬁrst, whether ideology trends with elite and partisan polarization, second, whether partisan
polarization was caused by ideological or partisanship change and ﬁnally whether any ideo-
logical trends were found predominantly in partisans. We found that ideological polarization
was associated with elite and partisan polarization (accept H1 and H2), that ideological
change was required (accept H3a) and partisanship change was not required (reject H3b)
to explain the observed pattern of partisan depolarization, and that ideological convergence
occured amongst partisans and initially ideological similar non-partisans alike (reject H4).
We rejected party sorting mechanisms because ideology was not stable and partisan depolar-
ization did not primarily occur through changing partisanship. We also ruled out elite cue
mechanisms, and thus the most prominent account of elite polarization causing ideological
polarization, because we found virtually identical ideological convergence amongst partisans
and initially ideologically similar non-partisans. We therefore endorsed an ideological polar-
ization account of citizen ideological dynamics in Britain.
What are the implications of these ﬁndings for the study of polarization dynamics? We
have presented evidence of a relationship between ideological change and elite polarization.
The absence of this relationship is used by party sorting theorists to argue that elite polar-
ization is caused by intra-elite dynamics and that parties cannot shape citizen ideology. We
have also presented evidence that the relationship between elite and ideological polarization
is not the result of partisans distinctively following parties to new ideological positions. This
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rules out the two most commonly found accounts of partisan polarization: party sorting and
elite cue accounts. Both of these accounts are elite driven.
Although we reject the two most common elite driven accounts of partisan polarization,
we recognise that other elite driven explanations remain possible. We have shown that if
elite polarization does cause mass polarization, it does so through a mechanism which has
an eﬀect on partisans and non-partisans alike. This could arise because ideological cues are
not coming from parties but from another elite group, perhaps from the news media or social
movements. It is also possible that the ideological signals do originate with parties, perhaps
with them changing the national conversation. This latter case would imply that parties
cause general ideological changes, so we would need to replace the party sorting view that
parties cannot aﬀect citizen ideology, with its opposite, that parties have a very extensive
eﬀect on ideology which runs across the whole population. Either way, as has been pointed
out in the American context, an account where ideological signals from elites substantially
shift the ideology of citizens provides a challenge to the whole spatial modeling framework
(Carsey and Layman 2006).
Another possibility is that elite polarization is driven from the bottom-up by ideological
polarization and that parties are responding to these changes. This bottom-up account is usu-
ally taken to be the implication of ideological polarization arguments in the US (Abramowitz
2010; Abramowitz 2013). Although we have not tested the mechanisms, we consider what
could have led to such bottom-up ideological change in Britain by indicating a possible pro-
cess. The declining size and organization of the manual working class and the increasing size
of the salariat would be expected to weaken the group identities traditionally thought of as
being most generative of redistributive ideology (Evans and Tilley 2017; Kitschelt 1993). In
addition, the extended period of economic growth from the early 1990s reduced the salience
of many of the trade-oﬀs relating to redistributive ideology (increased welfare spending did
not automatically imply increased taxation), further contributing to ideological depolariza-
tion (Clarke 2009). These economic trends reversed with the 2007/8 ﬁnancial crisis, which
sharply increased the salience of redistributive ideological trade-oﬀs and may also have re-
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oriented group identity dynamics (Whiteley et al. 2013). Thus, if redistributive ideology
emerges as conventionally described, out of group identities and material interests, where
material interests are a stronger determinant in conditions of economic adversity, then there
are reasons to expect the depolarization and repolarization patterns we have described in this
article. If a bottom-up account is accepted it would provide an explanation for prominent
aspects of recent elite polarization dynamics in Britain which can be hard to explain from
a top-down perspective. In particular, given Labour MPs' views of Jeremy Corbyn, it is
diﬃcult to see the leftward shift associated with his election as leader as a strategic move by
party elites, rather than a bottom-up process.
Further research is needed to decide between the bottom-up and alternative top-down
possibilities. However, either case requires a substantially new account of elite polarization
dynamics in Britain.
Our ﬁndings also have implications for the understanding of the dynamics of redistributive
ideology beyond the observation that they are related to elite polarization. We demonstrated
that substantial ideological change took place at the individual level. This challenges the stan-
dard model of individual level stability in redistributive ideology (after it has been formed
when young through socialisation). This implies that, and indeed we have presented a case
where, substantial changes in the ideological structure of society can occur without the gen-
erational replacement which is usually the speciﬁed mechanism of aggregate level ideological
change (Inglehart 1997). Our demonstration that ideological change caused partisan depo-
larization in the post-Thatcher years also leaves a number of substantive arguments about
British political dynamics in need of reassessment, in particular party sorting assumptions
to the contrary play a central role in recent accounts of the decline of class voting (Evans
and Tilley 2012; Evans and Tilley 2011; Evans and Tilley 2017).
In comparative terms our ﬁndings also challenge the claim that ideological change is
unlikely ever to found in any case of elite polarization, which was taken to the comparative
implication of ﬁnding ideological stability in the extreme case of depolarizing Britain. We do
not suggest that there are general expectations in the opposite direction; that party system
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change will always be associated with ideological change and that partisan polarization will
always be caused by ideological change more than partisanship change. However, closely
related patterns of ideological change have been found in Holland and Germany (Munzert
and Bauer 2013; Adams, de Vries, and Leitner 2012). Understanding these patterns of
ideological change in a comparative perspective therefore seems an important direction for
future research.
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Appendices for Depolarization, Repolarization and Redistribributive
Ideological Change in Britain, 1983-2016
A Analysis of Hypotheses Using Multi-Nomial Cross-Lagged Regression Coef-
ﬁcients Only
Why is it not generally possible to make inferences about whether ideology was stable, and whether partisanship change or
ideological change was responsble for partisan polarization dynamics from the parameters of multi-nominal cross-lagged panel
models without further information?
The issue is straightforwardly that multi-nominal model parameters descibe transition probabilities, but the eﬀect of these
transition probabilities generally depends on the population that they operate on. These observations are not controversial,
and follow directly from the fact that the transition probabilities describe transition matricies and the operation of transition
matrices generally depends on the populations they operate on. For a general discussion of these features see for example
Caswell 2001. We illustrate these points in the actual case we are interested in, that is the seven wave aggregate population
composition described in their Table 1 (reproduced in Table 1) and the main model described in Table 2 of Evans and Neundorf
2018 (reproduced in Table 2).
A.1 Ambiguity about ideological stability
We begin by looking at the implications of the ideological stability coeﬃcients alone (that is we ignore the impact of partisanship
on ideological dynamics) for ideological change. This approach directly compares to Evans and Nuendorf, who also discuss
1
Table 1: Latent values and partisanship (percent) (Source: Evans and Neundorf 2018, Table 1)
1
Table 2: Cross-lagged models: estimates of transition probabilities in raw form (Source: Evans and Neundorf 2018, Table 2)
Ideology [t-1]
[t] Centrist Leftist Rightist
Centrist .97 .13 .07
Leftist .02 .87 .00
Rightist .01 .00 .93
Table 3: Multi-nominal Cross-Lagged Model Ideological Stability Parameters in Transition Matrix Form. Source: Evans and
Neundorf 2018 Table 2
ideological stability using only stability coeﬃcients. Looking at the reduced parameter set has no impact on the conclusions
which are drawn in this case (this is not surprising because the impact of partisanship on ideology is not signiﬁcant in the model,
which means that transition probabilities will be very similar for partisans and non-partisans). In this sub-section we show that
the multi-nominal cross-lag ideological stability coeﬃcients reported in Evans and Neundorf 2018 by themselve are compatible
with ideological stability, ideological depolarization and ideological polarization conclusions. We also show that when analysed
in conjection with information about population composition reported in Evans and Neundorf 2018 the model implies ideological
depolarization conclusions.
Table 2 gives the stability coeﬃcients in their raw logit form and Table 3 transforms into transition matrix form. The main
observation in the paper supporting the conclusion that ideology is very stable is that the raw logit form coeﬃcients are very
large (and larger than the equivalent for party identiﬁcation). The equivalent observation in transition matrix form is that
the transition probabilities on the diagonal are close to 1. These transition probabilities are large on the diagonal, but this
2
operation of this matrix can best be understood by considering that the matrix has an equilibrium (77% centrist, 12 % rightist,
11 % leftist) and dynamics towards that equilibrium are described. Figure 1 shows the ambiguity that this creates about the
description of ideological polarization trajectories by plotting trajectories of leftist, centrist and rightist population proportions
from a depolarized, equilibrium and polarized initial starting points. From the depolarized starting point we observe ideological
polarization (centrism declines whilst rightism and leftism increase), from equilibrium starting points we observe ideological
stability (the proportions of centrism, leftism and rightism remain stable) whilst from a polarized starting point we observe
ideological depolarization (centrism increases whilst rightism and leftism decrease).
The case of polarizaed initial conditions used in this example is of particular importance because 49% centrist, 25% leftist
and 25% rightist, are the initial conditions which generate the seven wave population aggregate ideological composition reported
in the paper and reproduced in Table 1 of 58% centrist, 20% leftist and 22% rightist. This shows that the information reported
in Evans and Neundorf 2018 implies ideological depolarization, but the same conclusion is immediately accessible by noting that
the reported aggregate population composition is more polarized than the matrix equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Multi-nominal logit predicted changes in leftist, centrist and rightist population compostion in seven survey waves from
diﬀerent initial conditions. The right-hand three panels show the ideological depolarization that arises from initial conditions
that generate the observed seven wave aggregate ideological compostion reported in Evans and Neundorf (2018). The two other
columns illustrate that the transition matrix would describe very diﬀerent patterns if inital conditions were diﬀerent and so no
inferences can be made from model parameters alone.
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A.2 Cross-lagged Panel Model Parameters and Further Information Imply Partisan Depolar-
ization Was Caused by Ideological and Not Partisanship Change
We now turn to showing that the cross-lagged model analysis implies that ideological change and not partisanship change was
responsible for the observed pattern of partisan depolarization. We also show that inferences about this cannot be made from
model parameters alone in isolation from information about initial conditions.
Multi-nominal cross-lagged model the parameters describe two transition matricies, one of these matricies describes ideological
dynamics and the other describes partisanship dynamics. The combined dynamics are described by the operation of both these
matricies together. In addition to providing an account of both partisanship dynamics and ideological dynamics independently,
because it models all 81 transitions between all nine latent states (which are the combinations of three ideological conditions
and the three partisanship condition) the model also describes the changing association between ideology and partisanship. The
cross-lagged coeﬃcients are informative about the equiliburim state of the transition matrix. The insigniﬁcant cross-lagged
coeﬃcient of partisanship on ideology indicates that the equilibrium state of ideological transitions alone describes a condition
where there is (approximately) zero correlation between ideology and partisanship. The signiﬁcant cross-lagged coeﬃcient of
ideology on partisanship indicates that there is a correlation between ideology and partisanship in the equilibrium resulting from
partisanship dynamics alone. If we were starting from an initial condition where ideology and partisanship were uncorrelated,
we would conclude that increasing partisan polarization was due entirely to partisanship changes. However, the initial condition
in the BHPS is that ideology and partisanship start from a highly correlated position. Therefore the ideological transitions
described by the model are leading unambiguously to partisan depolarization, whilst the depolarizing `desorting' described by
partisanship transitions is being at least to some extent counter-acted by a sorting dynamics.
To demonstrate this we plot patterns of partisan polarization measured by correlation between partisanship (where Con-
servative = 0, No Identiﬁcation = 0.5, and Labour = 1) and ideology (rightist=0, centrist=.5, leftist=1) all caused by the full
transition matrix derrived from the parameters in Table 2 above from diﬀerent starting points. We plot trends in partisan
polarization with both ideological and partisanship transitions in place in grey, the trends caused by partisanship change alone
in the left panels in black and the trend caused by ideological change alone in the right hand panels in black. The three rows in
Figure 2 are all generated by the same transition matrix operating on diﬀerent starting populations. In the top case partisanship
change alone does not come close to generating the partisan polarization trend, but ideological change does, in the middle case
ideological change alone does not come close to generating the partisan polarization trend, but partisanship change does, whilst
in the bottom case both dynamics are required to come close to the partisan polarization trend. Taken together this illustrates
that the question of whether partisanship change or ideological change explains observed trends in partisan polarization cannot
be determined from model parameters (or equivalently transition matricies) alone. However, the top panel is the trajectory
which is of substantive interest because it is these initial starting points which generates the seven wave population compostions
reported in Table 1. It is thus clear that cross-lagged models show that ideological change is required and partisanship change
is not required to explain the observed pattern of partisan depolarizaiton. There is thus agreement between cross-lagged model
conclusions and our analysis using ﬁxed partisanship and ﬁxed ideology trends.
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Figure 2: Multi-nominal logit cross-lagged model predicted partisan depolarization (grey) compared to model projected partisan
depolarization by changing partisanship alone (black, left panels) and changing ideology alone (black, right panels) from initial
conditions generating observed seven wave reported population structure (top panel) and two other starting points. The top
panel shows that the model and reported starting positions imply changing ideology is required but changing partisanship is not
required to explain partisan depolarization. The other panels show that this conclusion cannot be derrived from the transition
matrix alone.
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A.3 Cross-Lagged Panel Model Parameters and Further Information Imply Ideological Con-
vergence amongst partisans and initially ideological similar non-partisans alike
We now show that the cross-lagged model parameters imply that partisans and initially ideologically similar non-partisans
show similar patterns of ideological convergence. We create the group of initially ideologically similar non-partisans by creating
a case for each partisan with the same ideological condition but with a non-partisan ideological state. Figure 3 provides the
evidence on the relative depolarization rates. The left panel shows the clearly depolarizing trend of the initial group of partisans
and the right hand panel showing depolarizaiton between non-partisans with the same initial ideological distribution as the
partisans. The two groups share a virtually identical downward trend so we conclude that that convergence is observed in
partisans and initially ideologically similar non-partisans alike.
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Figure 3: Partisan depolarization (ﬁxed groups) and matched (ﬁxed groups) depolarization
B Redistributive Questions Used in the Analysis
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Survey Name Question Response type Number waves
BSAS scale rich There is one law for the rich and one for the poor 5-point agree disagree 29
BSAS scale wealth Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth 5-point agree disagree 27
BSAS scale redist Government should redistribute income from the better oﬀ to those who are less
well oﬀ
5-point agree disagree 28
BSAS scale boss.exploit Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance 5-point agree disagree 29
BSAS scale big.busns Big Business beneﬁts owners at the expense of workers 5-point agree disagree 28
BSAS dole Are beneﬁts for unemployed people too low and cause hardship or too high,
discouraging them from ﬁnding jobs?
5-point agree disagree 29
BSAS more.welf Government should spend more on welfare beneﬁts for the poor even if it leads to
higher taxes
5-point agree disagree 26
BSAS unemp.job Around here most unemployed people could get a job if they wanted one 5-point agree disagree 26
BSAS welf..feet If welfare beneﬁts weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own
two feet
5-point agree disagree 26
BSAS welf.dam.lives Cutting welfare beneﬁts would damage too many people's lives 5-point agree disagree 17
BSAS soc.help Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help 5-point agree disagree 26
BSAS dole.ﬁdl Most people on the dole are ﬁddling in one way or another 5-point agree disagree 26
BSAS income.gap Would you say the gap between those with high incomes and those with low
incomes is too large, about right or too small?
3 choices 27
BSAS tax.spend Should government reduce taxes and spend less on health, education and social
beneﬁts OR keep taxes and spending the on these services the same OR increase
taxes and spend more on health, education and social beneﬁts
3 choices 32
BSAS proudwlf The creation of the welfare state is one of Britain's proudest achievements 5-point agree disagree 17
BSAS fail.clm Do you agree that large numbers of people who are eligible for beneﬁts these days
fail to claim them
binary agree disagree 20
BSAS welf.helpn The welfare state encourages people to stop helping themselves 5-point agree disagree 29
BHPS fairshare Ordinary people get a fair share of the nation's wealth 5-point agree disagree 7
BHPS onelaw The is one law for the rich and one for the poor 5-point agree disagree 7
BHPS privateent Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems 5-point agree disagree 7
BHPS gvtprovjob It is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one 5-point agree disagree 7
BHPS strngtu Strong trade unions are needed to protect the working conditions and wages of
employees
5-point agree disagree 7
BHPS stateown Major public services ought to be in state ownership 5-point agree disagree 7
BES redist Some people feel that government should make much greater eﬀorts to make
people's incomes more equal. Other people feel that government should be less
concerned about how equal people's incomes are. And other people have views
in-between. Which view comes closest to your own?
11-point self-placement 4
BES natlize Some people feel that government should nationalize many more private companies.
Other people feel that government should sell oﬀ many more nationalised
industries. And other people have views somewhere in-between. Which view comes
closest to your own?
11-point self-placement 4
BES infunemp Some people feel that getting people back to work should be the government's top
priority. Other people feel that keeping prices down should be the government's
top priority. And other people have views somewhere in-between. Which view
comes closest to your own?
11-point self-placement 4
BES taxspend Some people feel that government should put up taxes a lot and spend much more
on health and social services. Other people feel that government should cut taxes a
lot and spend much less on health and social services. And other people have views
somewhere in-between. Which view comes closest to your own?
11-point self-placement 4
Table 4: Redistributive Attitude Questions in the British Social Attitudes Survey, the British Household Panel Survey and the
British Election Study
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C Additional Evidence on Ideological Polarization
Proportion of extreme values in redistributive attitudes
1983-2007 2007-2016
All Surveys BSA BHPS BES BSA
Intercept 0.24 (0.02) 0.21 (0.01) 0.17 (0.02) 0.45 (0.06) 0.04 (0.01)
Time (decades) -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.05 (0.04) 0.04 (0.01)
Residual SD:
Intercepts 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.02
Trends 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02
Data 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.01
N 275 217 42 16 130
Groups 23 13 6 4 13
Table 5: Results of Multi-Level Models With Dependent Variable as proportion of extreme values in Redistributive Attitudes in
Period 1983-2007 and 2007-16. Models show results across all three surveys and in each survey independently.
Figure 4 shows the proportion of extreme redistributive attitudes in each survey wave relating to each of the twenty-three
attitudes with more than three response categories and models are summarized in Table 5. The overall negative trend in extreme
values across all three surveys in the ﬁrst period is summarized in the regression with the signiﬁcant trend of -.04 (SE: .01) per
decade. Signiﬁcant average negative trends are also found when analyzing the subset of attitudes from just the BSAS and the
BHPS, the trend in the BES data alone is also negative but not statistically signiﬁcant. In the period after 2007 the pattern is
reversed, with increasing proportion of redistributive attitudes falling into the extreme categories with an average positive per
decade trend of +.04 (SE: .01).
ρ = attitude × attitude
1983-2007 2007-2016
All Surveys BSA BHPS BES BSA
Intercept 0.25 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01) 0.34 (0.01) 0.30 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02)
Time (decades) -0.03 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00) -0.08 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) 0.05 (0.00)
Residual SD:
Intercepts 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.19
Trends 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
Data 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
N 2124 1995 105 24 1176
Groups 157 136 15 6 136
Table 6: Results of Multi-Level Models With Dependent Variable as Correlation between Two Redistributive Attitudes in Period
1983-2007. Models show results across all three surveys and in each survey independently.
Figure 5 and Table 6 show the results relating to attitude constraint. Because constraint involves the relationship between
two attitude pairs there are 157 attitude pairs to consider. This is too many to display, so for reasons of space ﬁgure 5 is restricted
to all 15 attitude pairs from the BHPS, all 6 pairs from the BES the all 10 attitude pairs from the BSAS redistributive scale
(thus omitting 126 pairs from the BSAS). All 157 attitude pairs are included in the model used to generate the trend lines, and in
the regression table. During the period of partisan depolarization there is a statistically signiﬁcant decline in attitude constraint
across the 157 attitude pairs of -.03 (SE: .00) per decade. Signiﬁcant negative trends are also found when analyzing the subset
of attitudes from just the BSAS and the BHPS, the trend in the BES data alone is also negative but not statistically signiﬁcant.
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Figure 4: Trends in Proportion of Extreme Views
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Figure 5: Trends in Constraint Between Redistributive Attitudes 1983-2007 and 2007-2016
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In the period of party repolarization after 2007 the reverse pattern is found with a signiﬁcant positive trend of redistributive
attitude constraint of magnitude +.05 (SE: .00).
σ of redistributive attitudes
1983-2007 2007-2016
All Surveys BSA BHPS BES BSA
Intercept 0.21 (0.01) 0.22 (0.00) 0.22 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01) 0.18 (0.00)
Time (decades) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Residual SD:
Intercepts 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Trends 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Data 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
N 275 217 42 16 130
Groups 23 13 6 4 13
Table 7: Results of Multi-Level Models With Dependent Variable as Standard Deviation of Redistributive Attitudes in Period
1983-2007. Models show results across all three surveys and in each survey independently.
The models for standard deviations broken down by survey are summarized in Table 7. In the data overall we ﬁnd that there
is a statistically signiﬁcant decline in the average standard deviation of attitudes, the magnitude of which is -.01 per decade (SE:
.00) during the period of party depolarization. A signiﬁcant negative trend is found in all three of the surveys independently. In
the period of party polarization after 2007 this trend is reversed with a statistically signiﬁcant trend of +.01 (SE: .00).
D Additional Evidence on Partisans and Non-partisan ideological trends
D.1 Trends in Ideological Depolarization amongst Partisans and Non-Partisans
σ extremism constraint
non-partisan partisans non-partisan partisans non-partisan partisans
Intercept 0.19 (0.01) 0.21 (0.00) 0.12 (0.02) 0.15 (0.01) 0.14 (0.02) 0.40 (0.01)
Time (decades) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) -0.02 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.09 (0.01)
Residual SD:
Intercepts 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04
Trends 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Data 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03
N 42 42 42 42 105 105
Groups 6 6 6 6 15 15
Table 8: Results of Multi-Level Model With dependent variable as standard deviation, extremism and constraint of responses
amongst the ﬁxed group of partisans (partisan in initial wave) and the ﬁxed group of non-partisans (non-partisan in initial wave)
in the BHPS 1991-2007.
Table 8 shows the trends in attitude standard deviations, attitude extremism and attitude constraint in the BHPS for the
ﬁxed group of inital wave Labour and Conservative partisans and the ﬁxed group of initial wave non-partisans. The analysis
shows that there is a signﬁcant reduction in standard deviations, attitude extremism and attitude constraint amongst the
partisans, and a signiﬁcant reduction in standard deviations and extremism but not constraint amongst the non-partisans. The
central elements of ideological convergence can be observed amongst the non-partisans, so we reject the idea that ideological
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convergence is restricted to partisans whilst the ideology of non-partisans remains unchanged, but ideological convergence is
much more pronounced amongst the partisans. Although signs of convergence are much clearer amongst partisans than non-
partisans, analysis does not establish the elite cue claim that ideological convergence is because of partisanship. Cleaer patterns
of convergence could occur because of the large initial diﬀerences, particularly on constraint, between partisans (intercept: .40
SE: .01) and non-partisans (intercept: .14, SE: .01). To address this question directly it is necessary to examine the ideological
trajectory of initially ideologically similar partisans and non-partisans, that is the logic of the analysis in section 7.
D.2 Balance Tests on Ideological Matching
case variable non.partisan partisan diﬀerence sig.diﬀ
Labour and Labour Matches fairshare 4.02 4.00 -0.02
Conservative and Conservative Matches fairshare 3.15 3.16 0.01
Labour and Labour Matches onelaw 4.07 4.08 0.00
Conservative and Conservative Matches onelaw 3.26 3.23 -0.03
Labour and Labour Matches privateent 3.61 3.59 -0.03
Conservative and Conservative Matches privateent 2.50 2.54 0.05
Labour and Labour Matches stateown 3.43 3.46 0.02
Conservative and Conservative Matches stateown 2.58 2.56 -0.02
Labour and Labour Matches gvtprovjob 3.53 3.47 -0.05
Conservative and Conservative Matches gvtprovjob 2.59 2.49 -0.10 *
Labour and Labour Matches strngtu 3.78 3.82 0.04
Conservative and Conservative Matches strngtu 2.56 2.56 0.01
Table 9: Balance check on ideological matching. Signiﬁcance indicated by Mann-Whitney Test. * indicates p<.05.
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